The Doklam Stand-off: A Rational Approach
UPDATE (21-07-2017): Apparently the "Doklam plateau" as marked in Google Earth is not where the current standoff is happening at all. It may be that the labels in Google Earth are incorrect. See http://vatsrohit.blogspot.com/2017/07/doklam-plateau-india-bhutan-and-china.html for a discussion of the geography. It seems that the Chinese do want to come further south along Chumbi valley, and control a strategic ridge line dominating the plains of the Siliguri corridor. This is unacceptable to India and is being strongly resisted. Thanks to @bennedose and @KesariDhwaj (Rohit Vats) for clarifying. However there are several points in this post which remain valid and hence it is being retained.
UPDATE (22-07-2017): Apparently, 1890 convention between Tibet and Britain says that the border begins at Mount Gimpochi, the western point of the Jampheri Ridge. See "Danger at Dolam". (Mt Gimpochi seems to be marked as "Mt Gymochen" in the maps given the the blogpost referred to above.) Apparently the Chinese have already constructed a road right up to the Indian post at Doka La, which is some 3 km north of the Jampheri ridge. Now the want to extend the Road to the ridge, which is being objected to by Bhutan and India. The Jampheri ridge is a strategic location, and Bhutan does have a right to construct its posts there, even if we accept the 1890 convention.
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(Bhutan's claim apparently not supported by "Watershed" principle)
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A rational methodology for determining boundaries
Let us start from the principle that the natural boundaries between nations are along rivers and along ridge lines. It may be difficult to apply this principle in densely populated areas, but it is a reasonable principle to begin with for the sparsely populated Bhutan-China border.
Consider the case of a river R flowing southwards from nation A to nation B. Let P1 be a point on the river, above which the river is inside nation A. Let P2 be another point on the river, below which the river is in nation B. Between P1 and P2, the river itself is the boundary, with nation A on the west, and nation B on the east. There are a number of streams, S1-S6, which join the river R. The situation is depicted in the image below.
Consider the case of a river R flowing southwards from nation A to nation B. Let P1 be a point on the river, above which the river is inside nation A. Let P2 be another point on the river, below which the river is in nation B. Between P1 and P2, the river itself is the boundary, with nation A on the west, and nation B on the east. There are a number of streams, S1-S6, which join the river R. The situation is depicted in the image below.
There are 4 kinds of regions that drain into river R.
- Regions draining into R above P1
- Regions draining into R below P2
- Regions draining into R between P1 and P2, from the west
- Regions draining into R between P1 and P2, from the east
Application to the Doklam Situation
Let us apply this principle to the Doklam plateau. Here is a map of Bhutan showing the Doklam area (source):
And here is a view of the Doklam area from Google Earth:
The river seen above, running south through Yadong in Tibet, is the Torsa river. The valley through which it flows is the Chumbi Valley. The yellow lines are the international borders, and the area outlined in red near the top is the disputed Doklam plateau.
The Torsa touches Bhutan at point P2. South of P2, the China-Bhutan border is along the Torsa river till point P3. The India-Bhutan-China tri-junction is marked "T" and is at the lower left. Upstream of P2, the China-Bhutan border goes north-east along a tributary of the Torsa, till point P1. Upstream of P1, both banks of this tributary are in Bhutanese territory. The Doklam plateau lies to the North of this area.
As can be verified by studying the topography in Google Earth, the Doklam plateau does not drain south into this tributary. In fact, it drains into another tributary that joins the Torsa at Yadong, which is undisputedly in Chinese territory.
Thus, by the principles discussed above, it appears that Bhutan's claim to the area is not well-founded.
I am not aware of the precise details of the new road in Doklam that China seeks to build. If the idea is to prevent China from constructing any roads in that area, then it's already too late for that. In fact, at this location (picture below), right in the middle of the Doklam area, we see that the Chinese have already built pretty good roads, and some buildings too.
Thus, Bhutan (and India) are disputing Chinese presence in an area which drains towards the northern side of the Himalayas, in which the Chinese have had a presence for a while. In my view, the Indian government should do more to fully explain its position and its overall strategy.
India's security concerns
India is concerned that a Chinese attack could threaten the sensitive "Chicken's neck" corridor linking the North-East to the rest of India. But the Doklam plateau does not seem to make much difference as far as the vulnerability of the "Chicken's neck" is concerned. The point P3 marked in the first Google Earth view above, on the China-Bhutan border, is only about 40 km (as the crow flies) from the North Bengal plains. The Doklam plateau is much further away.
There are, however, reports that the Chinese are claiming a large section of Bhutan, which would move China further South along the Chumbi valley, and thus closer to the North Bengal plains. A map purporting to show Chinese claims is below (source):
In my view, as long as the Chinese restrict their claims to the Doklam plateau, and do not try to expand southwards in Chumbi valley, there are no major implications as far as India's security is concerned.
A broader perspective on India-China relations
It is necessary to take a step back from the immediate irritants, and get a broader perspective on India-China relations, which will lead to a coherent long-term strategy.
From India's point-of-view, the biggest problem is China's financial, military and diplomatic support to the rogue Pakistani Military-Jihadi complex. From China's point-of-view, Tibet and the Dalai Lama appear to be the biggest issues they have with India. It is necessary to explore to what extent India and China can respect each other's sensitivities on these issues, starting perhaps with small steps.
China has long had a big political influence over Pakistan's military. Now, the CPEC is giving China a a major role in Pakistan's economy too. This influence of China over Pakistan is not necessarily a negative thing for India, provided there is some common understanding of the way Pakistan needs to evolve and be managed.
It is not correct to view Pakistan as a monolithic radicalized entity. There are many groups in Pakistan - Balochi, Pashtuns, Balti, Sindhi, Shia, Ahmedi etc - which are not hostile. To manage Pakistan, it is necessary to collaborate with nationalities, ethnic and religious interests within Pakistan, and also to reach an understanding with Pakistan's external sponsors. We should explore to what extent China can harmonize with India's overall Pakistan strategy.
It is interesting to observe how Buddhism and traditional Chinese culture are undergoing a revival in China. Yoga has also become popular in China, and has the tacit acceptance of the Chinese government. The China of today is apparently not hostile to Tibetan Buddhism, but would want its political concerns to be taken care of. India can play a positive role in a reconciliation between China and the Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile community. The Chinese will need to be assured that the role of the Dalai Lama will only be religious and cultural, and not political. In turn, the Chinese should assure the Tibetans that their religious, linguistic and cultural heritage will be protected and that they will enjoy local civic autonomy. If the Dalai Lama can harmoniously end his exile, and live at least partly in Tibet, there will be a huge boost to tourism in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhist culture is a precious part of China's heritage and indeed, of human heritage. Tibetan Buddhism will become a part of China's global soft-power, and will also become a bridge between the Indian and Chinese civilizations.
The economic relationship between India and China is already significant. The Chinese economy has reached a certain level of maturity, and it is natural that growth rates will reduce. China currently has excess capacity in several industrial sectors. India's economy lags China's by about two decades, and is expected to keep growing rapidly. India does need to nurture its domestic industry. But it should avoid the mistakes made by China, and also benefit from current Chinese overcapacity. India is a unified, expanding market, with 15% of the world's population, and has economic complementarities with China. Thus, China too can benefit from a partnership with India.
While there are clear benefits to both India and China from resolving irritants and mutual cooperation, we do have to give some thought to what India should do if there is no interest from the Chinese side. In my view, there is very little that can practically be accomplished by needling China on Tibet-related issues. It would be far better to focus on the trade relationship, which is heavily weighted in favour of China. Further, several nations in the region - e.g. Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan - have security concerns and territorial issues with China. Such nations would need to collaborate and help each other strengthen their defensive capabilities. India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing could also be reviewed. Needless to say, we hope that adversarial situations can be avoided, and that all will show due respect for each other's legitimate concerns.
The contrast between India and China in dealing with subversion is striking. China has been quite harsh in dealing with Islamists, with destruction of thousands of mosques, ban on the Muslim call to prayer (Azaan), ban on participation of children in religious activities, bans on beards, burkhas, Ramzan fasting, and even on Muslim names (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 3). I believe that it is possible and preferable to de-legitimize Islamist ideology without using brute force. But in India, we are at the other extreme. We watched helplessly as Islamists successfully ethnically cleansed 400,000 Kashmiri Hindus from their native land. We watch helplessly as Islamist terrorists openly brag about butchering dozens of Kashmiri Hindus, and continue roaming freely even after that. We are using taxpayer money to subsidize Madrassas which are injecting into our society, every year, lakhs of indoctrinated supporters of Sharia Law and the Caliphate.
China has completely barred the Catholic Church from operating on its territory. In contrast, we allow the Vatican, a foreign political entity, to appoint clergy within India, and we also tolerate these foreign-appointed clergy issuing Fatwas on the eve of our elections (Ref 1, Ref 2). We have made laws that make it almost impossible for Hindus to run schools, thereby facilitating a monopoly over the education sector for foreign-controlled organizations.
Occasionally one hears from Indians who lament the Chinese control over Tibet. To these I say - we are a nation in which large sections of the media are controlled by hostile interests, a nation where the majority have no right to autonomously run their own schools. Is it not advisable for us to free ourselves first, before talking of freeing others?
To conclude, if India and China can overcome their misunderstanding and hostility, it will help both civilizations to regain their historical prosperity, with each representing almost 25% of global GDP. Can they do this? Let us hope, for the sake of the world, that they can.
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Readers are welcome to leave their comments below, and/or contact the author at bharatdharma7@gmail.com
From India's point-of-view, the biggest problem is China's financial, military and diplomatic support to the rogue Pakistani Military-Jihadi complex. From China's point-of-view, Tibet and the Dalai Lama appear to be the biggest issues they have with India. It is necessary to explore to what extent India and China can respect each other's sensitivities on these issues, starting perhaps with small steps.
China has long had a big political influence over Pakistan's military. Now, the CPEC is giving China a a major role in Pakistan's economy too. This influence of China over Pakistan is not necessarily a negative thing for India, provided there is some common understanding of the way Pakistan needs to evolve and be managed.
It is not correct to view Pakistan as a monolithic radicalized entity. There are many groups in Pakistan - Balochi, Pashtuns, Balti, Sindhi, Shia, Ahmedi etc - which are not hostile. To manage Pakistan, it is necessary to collaborate with nationalities, ethnic and religious interests within Pakistan, and also to reach an understanding with Pakistan's external sponsors. We should explore to what extent China can harmonize with India's overall Pakistan strategy.
It is interesting to observe how Buddhism and traditional Chinese culture are undergoing a revival in China. Yoga has also become popular in China, and has the tacit acceptance of the Chinese government. The China of today is apparently not hostile to Tibetan Buddhism, but would want its political concerns to be taken care of. India can play a positive role in a reconciliation between China and the Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile community. The Chinese will need to be assured that the role of the Dalai Lama will only be religious and cultural, and not political. In turn, the Chinese should assure the Tibetans that their religious, linguistic and cultural heritage will be protected and that they will enjoy local civic autonomy. If the Dalai Lama can harmoniously end his exile, and live at least partly in Tibet, there will be a huge boost to tourism in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhist culture is a precious part of China's heritage and indeed, of human heritage. Tibetan Buddhism will become a part of China's global soft-power, and will also become a bridge between the Indian and Chinese civilizations.
The economic relationship between India and China is already significant. The Chinese economy has reached a certain level of maturity, and it is natural that growth rates will reduce. China currently has excess capacity in several industrial sectors. India's economy lags China's by about two decades, and is expected to keep growing rapidly. India does need to nurture its domestic industry. But it should avoid the mistakes made by China, and also benefit from current Chinese overcapacity. India is a unified, expanding market, with 15% of the world's population, and has economic complementarities with China. Thus, China too can benefit from a partnership with India.
While there are clear benefits to both India and China from resolving irritants and mutual cooperation, we do have to give some thought to what India should do if there is no interest from the Chinese side. In my view, there is very little that can practically be accomplished by needling China on Tibet-related issues. It would be far better to focus on the trade relationship, which is heavily weighted in favour of China. Further, several nations in the region - e.g. Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan - have security concerns and territorial issues with China. Such nations would need to collaborate and help each other strengthen their defensive capabilities. India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing could also be reviewed. Needless to say, we hope that adversarial situations can be avoided, and that all will show due respect for each other's legitimate concerns.
The contrast between India and China in dealing with subversion is striking. China has been quite harsh in dealing with Islamists, with destruction of thousands of mosques, ban on the Muslim call to prayer (Azaan), ban on participation of children in religious activities, bans on beards, burkhas, Ramzan fasting, and even on Muslim names (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 3). I believe that it is possible and preferable to de-legitimize Islamist ideology without using brute force. But in India, we are at the other extreme. We watched helplessly as Islamists successfully ethnically cleansed 400,000 Kashmiri Hindus from their native land. We watch helplessly as Islamist terrorists openly brag about butchering dozens of Kashmiri Hindus, and continue roaming freely even after that. We are using taxpayer money to subsidize Madrassas which are injecting into our society, every year, lakhs of indoctrinated supporters of Sharia Law and the Caliphate.
China has completely barred the Catholic Church from operating on its territory. In contrast, we allow the Vatican, a foreign political entity, to appoint clergy within India, and we also tolerate these foreign-appointed clergy issuing Fatwas on the eve of our elections (Ref 1, Ref 2). We have made laws that make it almost impossible for Hindus to run schools, thereby facilitating a monopoly over the education sector for foreign-controlled organizations.
Occasionally one hears from Indians who lament the Chinese control over Tibet. To these I say - we are a nation in which large sections of the media are controlled by hostile interests, a nation where the majority have no right to autonomously run their own schools. Is it not advisable for us to free ourselves first, before talking of freeing others?
To conclude, if India and China can overcome their misunderstanding and hostility, it will help both civilizations to regain their historical prosperity, with each representing almost 25% of global GDP. Can they do this? Let us hope, for the sake of the world, that they can.
----------------------------------
Readers are welcome to leave their comments below, and/or contact the author at bharatdharma7@gmail.com
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